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Abstract: The incidence of conflicts among communities over the collection of 
Yarsagumba, the high value caterpillar fungus, has increased after the Government 
of Nepal has lifted a ban on its collection and trade in 2001. In most cases, con-
flicts over Yarsagumba harvesting persist either between locals and outsiders, or 
between collectors within a local community. In the Api Nampa Conservation 
Area in Darchula District, Nepal, conflicts are primarily caused by the competi-
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tion for control over resources. The rights of the indigenous Shauka community 
(migratory herders), the Api Nampa Conservation Authority, and the non-Shauka 
communities of lower villages are at odds due to a lack of clarity, and the absence 
of coordination regarding the access to resources in the landscape. The Shauka 
community has restricted the Yarsagumba collection by ‘outsiders’ to specific and 
limited areas of their community forest and traditional grazing land. The lowland, 
non-Shauka community who are dissatisfied with the restrictions have excluded 
the Shauka people from the utilization of their winter pasture for animal grazing 
possible through the introduction of a community forestry programme. In this 
conflict, both communities suffer as the migratory lifestyle of the Shauka has been 
adversely affected, and earnings of the lowland community from Yarsagumba col-
lection have been reduced. This is a no-win situation. Our study suggests that the 
Government of Nepal should prepare a national Yarsagumba management policy 
and local Yarsagumba management guidelines to address conflicts by clearly 
defining the roles, responsibilities and rights of local institutions and actors, 
while ensuring the provision of particular services in the community forestry pro-
gramme to distant and seasonal users.
Keywords: Common pool resources, community forest, inter-community con-
flicts, Nepal, Yarsagumba collection
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1. Introduction
Nepal has undergone several policy reforms in the natural resource management 
sector realizing that people’s participation in the management, utilization and 
conservation of common pool resources is important. Community forestry (CF), a 
forest management model in which patches of government forest are handed over 
to the local community for management and utilization, has been a way of chang-
ing a de facto open access resource to de jure common property since the enact-
ment of the Forest Act in 1993 (HMGN 1993). This has been widely recognized 
as a policy breakthrough to provide rights and responsibilities to local people in 
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order to manage their forest resources (Kanel and Kandel 2004; Shrestha et al. 
2010). The policy change has been successful in escaping the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ and in attaining sustainable resource management through the estab-
lishment of local institutions equipped with socially accepted norms and values 
(Ostrom 1990; Chhetri and Pandey 1992). Community forestry thereby manages 
external pressure and community heterogeneity by identifying traditional forest 
users and providing membership to new entrants who move into the area, under 
locally established conditions (Adhikari 2001).
Despite the noticeable success, there are some lacunae in the CF model, 
which is otherwise considered a successful practice in the mid-hills of Nepal. 
One issue concerns the widespread control of local elites over the community for-
est user group which challenges the development of a proper CF model (Thoms 
2008). Another issue that has been overlooked in CF is the dependence on forest 
resources and the rights of distant and seasonal users to use these resources (Kanel 
and Kandel 2004), such as the Shauka community in our case study. In practice, 
CF arrangements usually determine that households in the proximity of a particu-
lar forest patch exercise their usufruct recognised by the state and, in return, take 
over the protection and management of that forest patch. This arrangement does 
not leave any room for the rights and responsibilities of users that are distantly 
located (Singh 2005; Ebregt et al. 2007), and may be exercising their rights sea-
sonally such as migratory herders. Considering this issue fact, the Government of 
Nepal has initiated the supplementary model of community-based forest manage-
ment called Collaborative forest management in 2000 in order to involve distant 
users in forest management (HMGN 2000; Rai 2007). However, in the existing 
CF model, seasonal users have to pay additional fees to be able to practice their 
traditional user rights (Kanel and Kandel 2004).
Despite adequate forest management policies and programmes in the mid-
hills and the Terai, the critical problems of the CF model particularly regarding 
the management of common property forest resources in high mountains, remain 
unresolved (Dhakal 2014). It has neglected the concerns of neighbouring com-
munities and nomadic herders in the high mountains (Skutch 2000). Migratory 
herders who have been using natural resources including forests and rangelands 
for livestock rearing during their seasonal movement (transhumance) are facing 
problems in exercising their traditional rights over forest resources along their 
migration routes, particularly in low altitude areas where the management of for-
est patches has been handed over to local users. Under the current practice of com-
munity forestry, forest users are identified and memberships are granted based on 
their proximity and availability to participate in forest management activities. 
The present study focuses on conflicts over the access to collection sites of 
Yarsagumba (Ophiocordyceps sinesis), a medicinal herb that is emerging as one 
of the biggest contributors to the cash economy in high mountain areas of Nepal 
(Shrestha and Bawa 2013). Yarsagumba, an endo-parasitic complex of a fun-
gus (Ophiocordyceps sinensis), is found in alpine and sub-alpine pastures of the 
Tibetan plateau and the Himalayas within an altitudinal range of 3500–5000 m 
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(Shrestha and Bawa 2013, 2014). The literal meaning of ‘Yartsa-gun-bu’ in the 
Tibetan language (‘Yarshagumba’ in Nepal) is ‘summer grass and winter worm’ 
(Holliday and Cleaver 2008). Nevertheless, it is a parasitic complex consisting 
of the fruiting body of a parasitic fungus (Ophiocordyceps sinensis) and its host 
caterpillar, the alpine ghost moth of the genus Thitarodes (Winkler 2011). This 
fungus-caterpillar complex is formed through a long process, most of which is 
still not well known. The host moth lays eggs that later develop into larvae or 
caterpillars. Before the larvae pupate, they are attacked and infected by the propa-
gules released by the stromata of the parasitic fungus (Cannon et al. 2009). The 
fungus spreads its mycelium inside the body of the host caterpillar and ultimately 
kills it. The body of the caterpillar mummifies giving the stroma the opportunity 
to emerge from the head of the mummified caterpillar. The stroma that is attached 
to the subterranean mummified caterpillar is harvested by the Yarsagumba 
 collectors. The stroma that is not collected remains in the landscape helping with 
Yarsagumba reproduction by releasing spores or propagules.
The collection of Yarsagumba provides high economic returns to mountain 
communities living in subsistence economies with increasing demand (Shrestha 
and Bawa 2013; Thapa et al. 2014). Since the prices of Yarsagumba have been 
increasing, a large number of people from lowland areas have been attracted to high 
mountain pastures for the collection of this species in hopes of making relatively 
quick income. However, people from high mountain areas do not want others, so 
called ‘outsiders’, to encourage competition and to decrease their share of potential 
income from this high-value product. They base their claim on sole collection and 
utilization of Yarsagumba on their proximity to the resource. On other hand, people 
coming from outside of the area to collect Yarsagumba argue that the mountain pas-
tures, where Yarsagumba can be found, do not belong to anyone and cannot be cate-
gorized as common property (with clear user rights given to a specific community). 
Since Yarsagumba has a well-defined collection season (May to July), thou-
sands of people move to the high Himalayan pastures to collect the so called 
‘Himalayan Gold’ every year. This has increased congestion in collection areas 
and triggered conflicts among collectors. In addition, there is competition among 
collectors and local traders to gain control over Yarsagumba habitats. Since the 
presence of government authorities is limited in these remote areas, most natural 
resources are managed by nearby local communities that create their own rules and 
regulations. This has created conflicts between locals and outsiders. Incidents have 
been frequently reported in recent years, with some conflicts resulting in physical 
assault, accidental death, and reported murder (Winkler 2010; Shrestha and Bawa 
2014). In this paper, we argue that the lack of clear property rights is a source of 
conflict among different parties involved in the Yarsagumba collection and trade. 
1.1. Conflicts over common pool resources
Conflicts over natural resources arise due to scarcity and the multifunctional nature 
of resources (Upreti 2004). Conflicts over common pool resources and the lack 
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of adequate conflict management strategies threaten the governance and sustain-
ability of natural resources (Ostrom et al. 1999). Conflicts are inherent in forest-
based livelihoods due to policy and legislative failures, institutional deficiencies 
as well as perceived goal-incompatibility among conflicting parties (Derkyi et al. 
2014). This is a common issue, because a large number of people has to compete 
over limited resources. Ignoring the possibility of conflicts may increase the likeli-
hood of conflict (Ostrom 2008). Additionally, the possibility of interfering with the 
attainment of one another’s goals and natural resource scarcity increase the chances 
for local conflicts (Derkyi et al. 2014). The difference between users can lead to 
disagreement in interests and appropriation of the resources that ultimately leads 
to conflict. In order to deal with a conflict over common pool resources effectively, 
an in-depth understanding of the conflict and its causes are required (Adams et al. 
2003). The Yarsagumba collection conflict and related disputes in the Api Nampa 
Conservation Area (ANCA) are typical examples of conflicts arising out of the 
absence of property rights. Although, legally the land belongs to the government, 
there is no effective monitoring or regulatory compliance in place. Therefore, it 
is de facto an open access resource. However, taking advantage of the participa-
tory management approach of the government, communities living closer to the 
Yarsagumba collection areas are claiming the resource as common property and not 
as a common pool resource. This paper aims to provide measures to deal with the 
existing conflicts in the management of Yarsagumba, including the assessment of 
socioeconomic dimensions and the evaluation of other dimensions of the conflicts. 
2. Theoretical context
Common-pool resources are man-made or natural systems that generate finite 
quantities of resource units so that one person’s use affects the quantity of resources 
available to another person. The majority of the resource systems that have been 
appropriated by traditional communities are considered as common property 
resources by various scholars (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 2002). Hardin (1968) brought 
greater attention to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ by demonstrating how overgraz-
ing could lead to resource degradation as individuals try to maximize their personal 
benefits (Hardin 1968). Hardin further emphasized that the tragedy of the com-
mons is more likely to occur in the case of highly valued, open access commons 
where either the members of the commons, external authorities, or both do not 
establish an effective governance regime (Hardin 1968). To overcome this, Hardin 
recommended that open access commons either should be controlled by a central 
authority, such as a government agency, or should be privatized by defining the 
rights of private enterprises to manage the commons (DeYoung 1999). 
Beyond the two options offered by Hardin, several scholars have documented 
cases in which local communities, rather than the government or private actors, 
have successfully managed resources that are in their proximity and are used 
to support the provision of several ecosystem services. It is now convincingly 
recorded that through age-old resource appropriation strategies, implemented 
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using well-defined rules and locally evolved institutions, several local communi-
ties have changed the state of a resource from common pool to common prop-
erty (Varughese and Ostrom 2001). These community management practices 
have provided substantial empirical evidence to prove that many of the common 
pool resources are self-governed with age-old norms and rules, so that human 
interaction, mutual learning and collective action help managing conflicts (Upreti 
2004). It is now a well-accepted fact that it is possible to manage common pool 
resources through local management systems and to maximize the benefits from 
the optimum use of resources at the same time (Ostrom 1990; Bardhan 1993; 
Baland and Platteau 1996). Furthermore, some studies have proposed that some 
appropriators have designed institutions that cope effectively with heterogeneity, 
and even conflicting claims and uses, provided that they communicate easily and 
have a good bargaining capacity (Ostrom et al. 1999; Ostrom 2002). It has also 
been documented that the allocation of collection areas to communities based on 
their traditional land use strategies and the control of resource users from outside, 
cause the self-policing of the resource through the local population (Weckerle 
et al. 2010; Childs and Choedup 2014). This conflict resolution strategy that has 
been adopted at local level in Tibetan regions and some parts of Nepal (Weckerle 
et al. 2010; Childs and Choedup 2014).
In general, common property resources can fulfil appropriators’ desires 
in homogenous settings where communities have similar socio-cultural back-
grounds, interests, and endowments (Keohane and Ostrom 1995). Problems of the 
commons arise in situations where the value of a particular commodity increases 
abruptly, such as in the case of Yarsagumba which attracts increased interest of 
neighbouring and/or distant communities. Each appropriator tries to maximize 
the per unit benefit, ignoring the per unit cost imposed on others. Appropriators 
start fulfilling their short-term interests, which results in outcomes that are not in 
anyone’s long-term interest (Ostrom et al. 1999). This situation creates conflict 
between insiders and outsiders.
3. Study area
The Darchula District is the second largest supplier of Yarsagumba after Dolpa 
District in Nepal (GON 2013). In Darchula, the total supply of Yarsagumba is 
obtained from six Village Development Committees (VDCs) namely Byas, Rapla, 
Ghusa, Khandeswori, Gulzar, and Situla. These VDCs comprise settlements of 
the Shauka community, an indigenous community, living in the upper Mahakali 
valley in the border area of Nepal and India. In the past, forest patches in these 
VDCs were managed by local communities as community forests. In 2010, the 
Government of Nepal established the Api Nampa Conservation Area (ANCA) in 
the northern part of Darchula District, including the six VDCs named above. 
ANCA encompasses an area of 1903 km2 comprising the high Himalayan 
mountain regions between the Mahakali River and the Chamilya Valley. It is 
bordered by the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) of China at the North and 
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Uttarakhand State of India at the West. The protected area is regulated by the 
Conservation Area Management Rule 1996 that promotes a community-based 
management approach (GON 1996). However, local community forests user 
groups (CFUGs), the institution formed under the community forestry model, are 
still functional and able to manage forest resources in this area. 
Out of the six VDCs in ANCA, the field survey was carried out in three alpine 
pastures with an elevation range between 3615 m and 4400 m, namely Api, 
Kuntison, and Budi of Byas VDCs (Figure 1). The survey is based on information 
from key informants of Yarsagumba collection sites and management regimes. 
The entire area is a part of the Changru Community Forest managed by the local 
Shauka community (Figure 2). The whole area is susceptible to conflict as the 
local Nepali Shauka community shares access to natural resources, including 
Yarsagumba, with the Indian Shauka community, but does not permit non-Shauka 
people from lowland villages of Nepal to collect Yarsagumba in Api and Kuntison 
(here after referred as Api-Kuntison). Instead, they allow collectors from the low-
land to use the ‘open’ pasture in the Budi area. Besides Yarsagumba availability, 
religious beliefs and customary rights influenced the Shauka community’s deci-
sion on which sites to consider access for outsiders (Pant et al. 2014).
Lowland villagers claim Yarsagumba as an open access resource consid-
ering it is not a regular forest product collected for daily household purposes. 
Competing claims on open access resources are common when resources are 
Figure 1: Map of Yarsagumba collection sites in the border area of Uttarakhand State of India 
and far western Nepal.
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limited and have a high value (Derkyi et al. 2014; Thapa et al. 2014). This has 
created conflicts resulting in seven deaths related to Yarsagumba collection 
reported from different Yarsagumba collection sites in Darchula between 2013 
and 2014 (ANCA 2014). 
4. Data collection
This study used both quantitative and qualitative approaches to collect data. Data 
was collected between March and July 2014 using a questionnaire survey, focus 
group discussions, and key informant interviews. Ninety-two randomly selected 
collectors, 51 from Budi (all non-Shauka) and 41 from Api-Kuntison (all Shauka), 
were interviewed about the collection sites using a semi-structured questionnaire. 
The questions were related to socioeconomic and environmental issues, institu-
tional arrangements of Yarsagumba collection, trade and quantity collected as 
well as demographic characteristics of the respondents. Out of 51 respondents 
from Budi, 37% were male and 63% were female, whereas, of 41 respondents 
from Api-Kuntison, 56% were male and 44% were female. In addition, four focus 
group discussions, two in Budi and two in Api-Kuntison, were carried out with 
Yarsagumba collectors. Each focus group discussion composed of around 15–20 
participants including all genders, ages and social status’. The discussion lasted 
for 45 minutes in average. Focus was placed on existing customary practices, 
challenges in Yarsagumba collection as well as on the collection of suggestions 
for improving the management of the resource. In addition, 21 local traders, and 
16 tea shop owners were interviewed. 
Figure 2: Sketch-map of Byas VDC, with grazing areas and Yarsagumba collection sites.
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In order to better understand existing issues and to triangulate information 
from the field, key informant interviews and group discussions were carried out in 
Khalanga, headquarters of Darchula District, with officials from ANCA, District 
Forest Office and District Development Committee, as well as district security 
personnel, representatives of the Shauka community, political party members, and 
local leaders. 
5. Results
5.1. Stakeholders of the conflict
The main stakeholders in the conflict over Yarsagumba collection in ANCA can 
be categorized into three groups: (i) the Shauka community, (ii) outsiders/ non-
Shauka collectors from lower lying VDCs, and (iii) the Api Nampa Conservation 
Area and other government authorities (Figure 3).
5.1.1. Shauka (Nepalese and Indian)
The Shauka community is an indigenous community of migratory herders of the 
upper Mahakali valley, the border area of Western Nepal and India, belonging to 
the same ethno-linguistic group. They historically dominated the trans-Himalayan 
trade route between the Indian plains to the Tibetan Plateau through the Mahakali 
valley for centuries. Since the Mahakali river marks the border of India and 
Nepal, the Shauka community is situated in two countries. In Nepal, the Shauka 
community consists of 174 households, most of them live in Byas VDC (CBS 
2011). The major income sources of the Shauka community nowadays are animal 
husbandry, subsistence agriculture, and trans-Himalayan trade. The Shauka com-
munity has traditionally practiced a system of transhumance between summer 
and winter pastures. During the summer months (May to October), they stay in 
the mountain villages of Byas VDC to cultivate crops such as cereals, potatoes, 
and beans and graze their livestock in the high alpine pastures. During the winter 
Figure 3: Stakeholders and their issues in the conflict (own source).
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months (November to April), they move down the Mahakali valley to Khalanga. 
This periodic movement is called ‘kuncha’ in Byasi language. During the sum-
mer, male members of the households are either involved in the trans-Himalayan 
trade to the Tibet Autonomous Region, China, or move to summer alpine  pastures 
to graze their livestock. Crop production plays a minor role in the household 
economy due to the low availability and productivity of agricultural land.
Nowadays, a major shift in the livelihood strategies of the Shauka people has 
been observed. Most of the households now keep a smaller number of animals for 
the transportation of goods as well as for milk and meat production. The decrease 
in livestock population can also be explained by the diversification of livelihood 
options by working as seasonal laborers in India and by the desire to be increas-
ingly involved in Yarsagumba collection and trade.
The Indian Shauka community located in Garbyang and Budi villages on the 
Indian side of the Mahakali river share a common culture with the Shauka com-
munity in Nepal (see Figure 1). The social ties between the Shauka communities 
are, as it seems, relatively independent of the political boundaries between the two 
countries. One interview respondent said: “We have a ‘food-and-daughter’ rela-
tionship with the Indian Shauka, and share our joys and sorrows with them. We 
generally leave our animals in the Garbyang area for grazing during the  winter. 
In return, Indian Shauka can access some summer alpine pastures in Nepal for 
livestock grazing and recently for Yarsagumba collection.” Although the statu-
ary rules are different in the two countries, the Shauka communities of the two 
countries claim to follow customary rules to regulate the sustainable use of their 
pastures. This system has been de facto used to resolve disputes arising due to the 
use of resources.
5.1.2. Non-Shauka from lower VDCs in Darchula (Nepal part)
Most of the Non-Shauka households living in the VDCs at low altitudes belong 
to different castes. They practice subsistence farming as well as growing crops on 
steep terraces. They have few animals and collect Non-Timber Forest Products 
(NTFPs) for their own consumption and sale. Over the years, more and more men 
have left the villages to work as wage laborers either in the urban centers of Nepal 
or abroad. Women are solely responsible for the cultivation of crops, the manage-
ment of household activities, and the care of family members including children. 
Given this situation, it is not surprising that the discovery of Yarsagumba 
in high alpine areas is considered a lucrative income source by these people. 
Consequently, over the last few years, most of the men who migrate for employ-
ment opportunities return home during the Yarsagumba collection season while 
the whole family often accompanies them to the Yarsagumba collection sites dur-
ing that time. Due to the overall deprivation and limited sources of income, these 
households are ready to take any risks to collect Yarsagumba. 
The Shauka only allow non-Shauka people to collect Yarsagumba in the 
Budi area. Limited access to Yarsagumba habitats has created dissatisfaction and 
annoyance among non-Shauka communities. They hold that they too have the 
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right to access community forests in Nepal as they are legal citizens. The situa-
tion is aggravated since the local Shauka community allows Indian Shaukas, who 
are perceived as ‘foreigners’, to collect Yarsagumba in Nepal. Furthermore, they 
consider Yarsagumba not as a regular forest product such as fuelwood and fodder, 
which are used for sustenance. Therefore, Shauka people do not have usufruct 
and cannot restrict the access of non-Shauka people to the Yarsagumba collection 
sites in the name of the property rights of the local Changru community forest 
user group.
5.1.3. Api Nampa Conservation Area (ANCA) and other government 
authorities
Twenty-one of the 41 VDCs of Darchula District fall within the territory of 
ANCA and are managed by the government authority of ANCA. ANCA follows 
a community-based management approach with the aims of conserving natural 
resources and improving the livelihoods of people living within the conservation 
area. The management structure encompasses two bodies: the government author-
ity, assigned by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation, 
and the community structure with representatives from each VDC forming the 
district-level ANCA Management Council. As ANCA was only established in 
2010, community members are still skeptical of the recently formed conserva-
tion area authority. Presently, the ANCA government authority collects royalties 
from Yarsagumba collection and issues permits to the traders, functions that were 
previously carried out by the District Forest Office, the government authority that 
operates the community forestry program outside of protected areas. In the year 
2014, ANCA collected royalties of NPR 8,630,000 (NPR 1 = USD $ 0.01) from 
863 kg of Yarsagumba collected and traded in the region (ANCA 2014). Besides 
the issuing of permits and the collection of tax, ANCA is the rightful institution 
responsible for law and order in the ANCA protected area. In addition, it plays 
a role as facilitator in the area monitoring the situation and bringing the differ-
ent district authorities and community committees together in order to mitigate 
conflicts. 
5.2. Underlying causes of conflict related to Yarsagumba collection
There are several proximate causes that have contributed to conflicts related to 
Yarsagumba collection including the socioeconomic condition of different social 
groups, political complexities, the environmental situation in the area as well as 
existing formal and informal institutional arrangements. These multifaceted and 
intertwined issues have hindered the process of conflict resolution further.
The main reason for conflict is the demand for access to alpine pastures where 
Yarsagumba is found from different social groups. These conflicts have, at time, 
escalated into physical violence between the Shauka and non-Shauka communi-
ties. There are also other underlying causes that ignite and influence the conflict 
at the local level: degradation of natural resources, conflicting policies on the 
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regulation of the extraction of non-timber forest products including Yarsagumba, 
and diverse institutional arrangements on the ground.
5.2.1. Conflicting policies and regulations related to Yarsagumba
Inconsistencies in the policies and practices related to Yarsagumba collection were 
discussed during a national workshop on the conservation and management of 
Yarsagumba in the Kailash Sacred Landscape of Nepal in Kathmandu in April 
2014 (DPR 2014). Various overlapping policies, regulations, guidelines, and acts, 
as well as diverse agencies implementing those policies, were found to be related 
to the regulation of access to Yarsagumba collection sites in Darchula and other 
parts of Nepal (see Table 1). Conflicts in legislation have resulted in confusion 
among local government agencies and community organizations regarding their 
rights, roles, and responsibilities. According to the Herbs and Non-Timber Forest 
Products Development Policy, the Government of Nepal encourages the harvesting 
and processing of NTFPs including Yarsagumba by local communities as an addi-
tional source of household income in mountain areas (HNCC 2004). Although the 
policy aims to promote the conservation and preservation of high-value NTFPs, 
particularly medicinal plants, sustainable harvesting practices for most NTFPs, 
including Yarsagumba have not been observed, causing a rapid decline of the natu-
ral resource base (Banjade and Paudel 2008; Shrestha and Bawa 2013).
The Forest Act 1993 and Forest Regulations 1995 consider CFUGs as an 
autonomous body responsible for the management, conservation, and utilization 
of forest products (GON 1993; GON 1995). Nevertheless, in practice, CFUGs 
in the ANCA area have been issuing permits for the collection of Yarsagumba 
in their community forests without any legal basis. It is not clearly stated in the 
laws and regulations of forest management whether Yarsagumba is included in 
the list of forest products that local communities have control over. Table 1 gives 
an overview of the existing policies, acts and regulations related to Yarsagumba 
management. However, local communities do claim that it is their right to control 
Yarsagumba collection based on customary practices, and the fact that the cat-
erpillar fungus is available in their community forest area. Furthermore, a lack 
of transparency in practices as well as ambiguity in the case of regulatory action 
have led to mistrust between communities and government authorities. 
5.2.2. Community forest, customary rights and distant users
Traditionally, the Shauka community practices vertical transhumance with sum-
mer pastures in their own traditional homeland in Byas VDC and winter pas-
tures around the town of Khalanga. After the Government of Nepal introduced 
the community forestry programme in mid 1970s, the management of forested 
areas which were mostly used as winter pastures by the Shauka community, was 
handed over to people residing in nearby villages. The community forest consti-
tution drawn by the CFUG restricts access to forests and pastures for resource 
extraction and use by those who were not members of the community forest user 
groups, which included the Shauka. 
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The introduction of the CF programme in this area has jeopardized the nomadic 
lifestyle of the Shauka community by excluding them from the resources they have 
been using for decades, and which are essential during their seasonal movement 
between Byas VDC and Khalanga (Figure 4). They now have to get permission 
from the respective CFUGs to travel through community forests and to extract 
fuelwood and fodder for cooking and feeding their livestock. One Shauka respon-
dent said, “We require fuelwood in the winter. If non-Shauka people provide us 
with access to collect forest resources from their CF during the winter, we would 
also provide them access to the restricted areas of our CF to collect Yarsagumba.” 
Similar conflicts were observed in other parts of the country after handing over 
Table 1: Relevant policies and regulations related to Yarsagumba management in Darchula 
District.
Policies and regulations 
 
Major focus  Line agencies under Ministry 
of Forest and Soil Conservation
Herbs and Non-Timber 
Forest Products (NTFP) 
Development Policy 
2004 (HNCC 2004)
 
•	 Calls for private sector participation in 
NTFPs development
•	 Emphasizes local processing
•	 Stresses conservation and preservation 
of high value herbs and NTFPs and as 
well as regulations on the amount to be 
harvested each season
 Department of Plant Resources 
Government of 
Nepal Gazette 2016 
(GON 2016)
 
•	 Allows users to collect Yarsagumba by 
paying NRP 25,000/kg
 Ministry of Forest and Soil 
Conservation
Conservation Area 
Management Rules 
1996 (GON 1996)
 
•	 Calls for the management of 
conservation areas through a 
community-based approach
•	 Provides communities the right 
to manage the area through the 
development of village management 
plans
 Department of National Parks 
and Wildlife Conservation
Community Forestry 
Directive 1995 and 
Community Forestry 
Development 
Programme Guidelines 
2008 (DOF 1995; 
DOF 2008)
 
•	 Government retains ownership of forest
•	 CFUG holds the right to use and make 
management decisions
•	 CFUG develops 5-year operational plan 
and annual plan, which need approval 
of government authority
•	 Government approves any sale outside 
the group, CFUG members are allowed 
to harvest, process, and sell timber and 
NTFPs
 Department of Forests
Forest Act 1993, Forest 
Regulations 1995, 
Forest Sector Policy 
2000 (GON 1993; 
GON 1995; GON 2000) 
 
•	 Provides legal document about property 
rights and user rights
•	 Regulates extraction and usage of 
forest products
Department of Forests
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community forests to local people, where traditional users, who reside far from 
the resources are excluded from resource utilization (Uprety 2006). 
The Yarsagumba collection sites in our study lie within the boundary of the 
Changru Community Forest in Byas VDC which is managed by the Shauka 
 community. Their approved five-year community forest operational plan which is 
the major document outlining how the CFUGs will manage their forest, expired 
in 2012. However, users have continued forest management practices that include 
a provision to protect their area from natural calamities and external influences. 
Since the area falls into the territory of the ANCA authority after its designation 
as conservation area, the forest patches are regulated by the recently approved 
ANCA management plan. However, the CFUG operational plan still needs further 
approval.
Based on the expired operation plan, the Shauka community restricts access to 
their community forest and usage of its natural resources including the extraction 
of Yarsagumba. The Shauka community has made the provision that Yarsagumba 
collectors from non-Shauka communities can pay an entrance fee to enter the Budi 
area for Yarsagumba collection. The entrance fee is not uniform and depends on 
Figure 4: Sketch-map of Api Nampa Conservation Area with the migratory route of the Shauka 
(own source).
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the origin of collectors, but ranges mostly between NPR 200 and 500 per  person. 
It is not clear how the collected fees have been utilized, and fee payers suspect 
that the collected amount has been embezzled. Therefore, they do not want to pay 
the entrance fee. This too has prompted inter-community conflicts.
5.2.3. Degradation and management of natural resources at Yarsagumba 
collection sites
The Yarsagumba habitat in the ‘open’ Budi area is unsuitable to accommodate 
a large number of collectors. Due to rising number of collectors, the likelihood 
of a decent harvest in the Budi area is now considerably lower, as can be seen 
in Table 2. Therefore, some of the non-Shauka collectors prefer to enter the 
restricted, ‘closed’ sites of the Api-Kuntison area, where the prospect to collect a 
more Yarsagumba is substantially higher.
The total number of Yarsagumba collected per family in Budi has decreased 
over the last 5 years, from an average of 475 pieces per family in 2010 to an aver-
age of 186 pieces per family in 2014. However, this trend cannot be observed in 
the Api-Kuntison area (see Table 2). More than 85% of the total respondents in the 
Budi area stated various reasons for the decrease in per capita Yarsagumba collec-
tion. The most common perceived reason for this decline is over-exploitation due 
to the increased number of collectors. In Api-Kuntison, the per capita number of 
Yarsagumba collection has increased slightly from 249 pieces per family to 283 
pieces per family on average over the last 5 years. This development might be 
caused by a smaller number of collectors at Yarsagumba collection sites in recent 
years after the community established strict regulations for collecting the caterpil-
lar fungus. Moreover, the community has improved camp site conditions in the 
Yarsagumba collection area by managing waste disposal, allocating fixed areas 
for defecation, and regulating fuelwood collection to reduce deforestation and 
forest degradation. However, it is unclear, whether these improvements or other 
factors have contributed to higher Yarsagumba yields.
In 2010, the average income of collector families at the closed site in 
 Api-Kuntison was 15% higher than the income at the open site in Budi; this num-
ber rose to 60% in 2014. The duration for Yarsagumba collection increased from 
49 to 55 days in Api-Kuntison, which might have contributed to the increase in 
per capita income. Although there was a slight increase in the collection sea-
son’s duration from 50 to 53 days in the Budi area, the income per family did not 
increase at the same rate as in Api-Kuntison. 
5.2.4. High contribution of Yarsagumba to household income
The competition for Yarsagumba is not surprising. Its possible share in the annual 
household income outweighs other traditional income sources, including agricul-
ture and livestock (Winkler 2009). Studies carried out in other parts of Nepal also 
show that Yarsagumba collection’s contribution to household income is highly sig-
nificant, working out to almost 72% of household income in Dolpa, Nepal (Shrestha 
and Bawa 2014). These earnings, which originate from only 2 months of engage-
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ment, can support a family for an entire year. This suggests that the opportunity 
costs of not participating in Yarsagumba collection are very high for collectors, 
which prompts them to even risk their lives. Approximately 96% of the respondents 
in Budi and 73% in Api-Kuntison stated that Yarsagumba collection is their primary 
source of income, followed by subsistence agriculture and seasonal labor. 
The Yarsagumba collection contributes to new cultural developments in the 
mountain regions of Nepal. More than two-thirds of the respondents (68%) reported 
that Yarsagumba collection is highly profitable. Because of this, other activities 
such as farming have become secondary, although most of the Yarsagumba col-
lectors are traditionally farmers (Negi 2007). During the collection season, virtu-
ally all socioeconomic activities come to a halt: schools close, government offices 
in the district headquarters of these mountainous districts become less functional, 
and social life is severely affected (Shrestha and Bawa 2014). 
Conflicts related to Yarsagumba collection are deeply rooted, with physical 
confrontation only as a superficial expression of deeper issues. They are related 
to unclear land use rights and changes in the land management regime without 
consideration of the traditional, customary rights of specific social groups. Current 
policies are unable to address new issues emerging with the rising importance of 
Yarsagumba collection. While drafting the policy documents, no one foresaw the 
increase in demand for the caterpillar fungus in international markets, hence no 
provisions were made. Policy change and alterations in related legislation have not 
been flexible enough, which has allowed this serious conflict to continue. While 
advocating for local control over natural resources, existing policy are lacking a 
holistic view not addressing the rights and needs of all stakeholders, including those 
distantly located and those who hold access rights only for a certain period in a year. 
Table 3 summarizes the underlying causes for conflicts in ANCA. They have 
been differentiated between causes directly related to Yarsagumba collection and 
trade as well as indirect causes that have stimulated the conflict.
6. Conclusion – opportunities to deal with the conflict
In the mountain areas of Nepal, customary systems based on local institutions 
exist in order to regulate access to, and use of, natural resources, which not man-
aged well are often causes for conflict between different groups (Upreti 2004; 
Aryal et al. 2013). However, sudden changes in the local context caused by the 
rising importance of economically high value goods such as Yarsagumba, can dis-
turb the existing management and governance systems as well as hinder effective 
conflict mitigation and resolution. Considering this situation, the national govern-
ment may need to interfere in order to manage the conflict, to clarify rights, roles 
and responsibilities as well as to build institutions that are able to resolve future 
disputes. So far, the Government of Nepal has not found a definitive way to deal 
with the increasing conflicts in an integrative manner, neither at the national level 
nor at the local level. At the local level in ANCA, efforts were made to elabo-
rate and implement local Yarsagumba management guidelines. These include the 
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clarification of roles and responsibilities in ANCA, the management of camp sites 
as well as collection of fees and the issuing of permits for Yarsagumba collec-
tion. However, in order to create a sustainable solution integrating user rights of 
distant communities, all stakeholders have to be involved in the process to clarify 
and agree up on responsibilities, roles and activities. As one crucial precondition 
for successful dispute mitigation and resolution is trust between all stakeholders, 
obvious and underlying tensions have to be made transparent. Only this way, an 
atmosphere of open discussions and negotiations is guaranteed. 
The present study suggests two strategies to minimize conflicts: one at the 
local level and another at the national level. At the local level, a give-and-take 
Table 3: Underlying causes for conflicts within ANCA.
Causes of conflict
Directly related to Yarsagumba collection Indirectly related to Yarsagumba 
collection
Socioeconomic High return of investment on Yarsagumba High poverty rate in the district 
forces the communities to look for 
alternative income sources
Policies Lack of specific policy concerning Yarsagumba in 
Nepal (it is regulated under the Non Timber Forest 
Products policy of 2004, which lists Yarsagumba 
as an open access natural resource)
The amount to be paid to the government authority 
for trade changed from NPR 10,000/kg in 2007 
GoN Gazette 2007) to NPR 25,000/kg in 2016
Participation of distant users and 
nomads in community forest 
management
Government 
authorities
Limited presence of government authorities in 
collection sites during the collection period to 
ensure property rights are obeyed
Various overlapping legal 
institutions in ANCA without 
coordination stimulate mistrust 
between communities and 
government authorities
Institution – 
Community 
Forest
 – Community forest regulations enable the 
Shauka community to make decisions on access 
to collection sites
 – Social ties of Nepali Shauka are closer to Indian 
Shauka than to non-Shauka communities of 
Nepal
 – The Shauka established Yarsagumba 
management committees for open sites such as 
the Budi gazing area
 – Community forest regulations 
and formation changed access 
for Shauka communities to 
forest areas during transhumance 
movements
 – Customary rights were not 
considered while creating the 
community forests and within 
the 5 year operational plans
Institution – 
ANCA
VDC-level ANCA Conservation Committees are 
not yet established or functional
ANCA structures are not yet fully 
established, functional, or accepted 
by the local communities
Environment  – Collection period lasts only for 2 months per 
year
 – Decreasing availability of Yarsagumba due to 
apparent overharvesting 
Productivity of agricultural land 
is decreasing which reduces 
household income and forces 
population to look for alternative 
income sources
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approach may help resolve the conflict. In order to get access to the closed 
sites for Yarsagumba collection, the non-Shauka community has to allow the 
Shauka community to use their traditional winter pasture without any hindrance. 
Alternatively, it would be also possible to open up the entire area that falls into 
the territory of ANCA to all residents living inside the conservation area ignoring 
the site specific forest user group approach. At the national level, the Government 
of Nepal has to prepare a clear policy and define the role of local institutions and 
actors in Yarsagumba collection and management. In addition, the Community 
forestry program must focus on the involvement of distant and seasonal users in 
the management systems of the landscape. The contribution of these groups in 
Community forestry management may not be feasible in terms of labor, but may 
be relevant in monetary terms. Other findings include: 
 – Policies need to be flexible enough to address changing needs of people.
 – Multiple institutions are not necessarily a limiting factor, and in the major-
ity of cases, are necessary. However, if there is no horizontal integration 
and coordination, these institutions are likely to work at suboptimal due 
to conflicts of interests.
 – Clarity of rights and reliability of legislative provisions are crucial factors. 
It is important to note that each location has its specific dynamics, customs, situ-
ations, and social groups that local governmental authorities have to consider and 
include in their decision making. Only then can conflicts be minimized, and natu-
ral resource management strategies be accepted by all social groups.
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